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Abstract 
 
The following project is concerned with how EU administrative conditionality to the Western 
Balkans leads to reform of the public administrations. An analysis of EU administrative 
conditionality to the rule adoption of the Civil Service Law of 1999 in Albania will provide a case 
study for answering the research question. The case study allows for a discussion of domestic 
politics and intervening factors, necessary in order to study the role of the EU. Reform of the 
public administration is defined as a precondition for economic and democratic reform and has 
lately become a key reform area in the EU integration process. The external governance theory 
of the External Incentive Model is used as the theoretical framework and applied to analyse EU 
administrative conditionality to the formal and behavioural rule adoption of the Civil Service Law 
in Albania in the period of 1996-2009.  
 
It will by the analysis be evident that the main factor affecting the rule adoption in Albania is the 
interest of the political actors of reducing the scope of the law and to ensure that it is not 
implemented and enhanced. This is evident as not even political consensus, which should lead 
to high adoption pressure, has sufficient impact. The development of a high determinacy and 
credibility of EU administrative conditionality does not alter the interest of the political actors 
sufficiently. Prospect of EU membership is concluded to not automatically lead to reform of the 
public administration in Albania. Adopting the case study to the reform of public administrations 
of the Western Balkans it is concluded that EU administrative conditionality does not lead to 
reform of the public administration in the Western Balkans without a domestic political 
environment ready and willing to fully adopt the conditions of the EU. This also shows that EU-
driven reforms in the Western Balkans does not automatically lead to the establishment of a 
public administration capable of ensuring democratic and economic reform as well as being 
capable of implementing the acquis communautaire of the EU.  
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Motivation 
  
The following project is made possible by an internship at the Danish Embassy in Tirana, 
Albania in the period of February – August 2010.  
 
Interested in analysing the EU integration process of the Western Balkans I researched the field 
and found that not many studies have addressed the integration process of the Western 
Balkans and the literature of EU conditionality has only been applied to a limited number of 
studies of the Western Balkans, in which especially the substance of EU conditionality has been 
analysed. The literature lacked perspectives and case studies of the transfer of conditions in 
which domestic politics and intervening factors were considered. The transfer of administrative 
conditions caught my interest, as these form the background for the economic and democratic 
development of the Western Balkans and furthermore is of central importance for the EU 
integration process. The research strategy was chosen on this background and enabled me to 
take advantage of the internship by using Albania as a case study.   
 
The rule adoption of the Civil Service Law in Albania has been carefully chosen. A correct 
implementation of the law is at the centre of attention of the European Union as a merit-based, 
depoliticized civil service is crucial in enabling the public sector to deliver services and limit 
corruption. The EU has continuingly and increasingly called for the correct implementation of 
the law whilst it has marked a considerable amount of its financial assistance to this area. On 
the other side the political situation in Albania is fragile and has since the fall of communism 
been dominated by the struggle between political veto players of the two biggest parties, the SP 
and the DP. It is well-known that political leadership of the country means the exclusion of the 
opposition and the removal of employees in the public administration supporting the losing 
party. The political situation has as a consequence suffered from long boycotts, lack of political 
dialogue, a capable and trained public administration and the consensus necessary for the 
continuing of the reform process of Albania.  
 
This all points to the importance of analysing how EU administrative conditionality impacts the 
reform of the public administration as this will lead to information of which factors of EU 
administrative conditionality that leads to reform as well as provide information of the challenges 
and problems related to reforming the public administration in Albania as well as in the Western 
Balkans.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The countries of the Western Balkan are together with Turkey the next in line for EU 
membership. The EU term Western Balkans includes Albania and former Yugoslavia with the 
exception of Slovenia and for the Western Balkans prospect of EU membership has become a 
main incentive for reform and a key priority of the foreign policy of all countries of the region 
(Jano 2008: 63 & SIGMA 2004: 1). A range of studies analyse the governance strategy of the 
EU towards the Western Balkans, however as will be evident by this project one cannot treat 
the EU as the independent factor without involving a study of domestic factors: Studying the role 
of the EU necessary involves a discussion of domestic politics and intervening factors. This 
project is set out to analyse the impact of the EU to the Western Balkans by a case study of the 
transfer of EU rules and conditions to the reform of the public administration in Albania. Reform 
of the public administration is defined as a precondition for economic and democratic reform 
and lately a key reform area in the EU integration process. It will become evident that the 
discussion of domestic politics and intervening factors holds the key to explain how EU impacts 
the reform of the public administration in the Western Balkans. 
 
In the following the research area is further introduced. This leads to the establishment of the 
aim of the project and the research question.  
 
1.1 EU conditionality to the Western Balkans 
The distinct pattern of the enlargement strategy of the EU towards the Western Balkans is 
based on the experiences gained through the enlargement process of the Central and Eastern 
European countries. This enlargement strategy was portrayed by the conditions for accession to 
the EU being the most detailed and wide-ranging ever formulated (Grabbe 2002: 250) and the 
countries targeted by a demanding political, social and economic conditionality. The 
conditionality was closely linked with the transition process towards democracy and market 
economy (Anastasakis & Bechev 2003: 5). Due to the need of addressing more difficult and 
demanding political and post-conflict transformation of the Western Balkans, the EU developed 
even more demanding political, social, economic and administrative conditionalities 
(Anastasakis 2008: 365).   
 
EU conditionality refers to a strategy of the EU in which the union sets rules as conditions that 
non-member states have to fulfil in order to get the EU rewards of assistance and institutional 
ties (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2004: 663). EU conditionality to the countries of the 
Western Balkan was established by the General Affairs Council on 29 April 1997, which 
established political and economic conditions to be fulfilled by these countries, linking EU 
conditionality of the transition period to the development of bilateral relations in the field of trade, 
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financial assistance, economic cooperation and contractual cooperation relations (Vurmu 2008: 
21). In 1999 the European Commission proposed a Stabilization and Association Process 
between EU and the Western Balkans. This did not change the existing conditions between the 
EU and the Western Balkans, but instead changed the nature of the contractual relationship, 
replacing the prospect of a Cooperation Agreement with a Stabilization and Association 
Agreement, offering for the first time the Western Balkans a prospect of EU integration. The 
perspective was reinforced by the Feira European Council on 20-21 June 2000 when it was 
established that all countries of the Western Balkan were to be considered potential candidate 
countries to the EU. In November 2000 during the Zagreb Summit the Stabilization and 
Association Process was officially endorsed (Vurmu 2008: 22).  
 
1.1.2 Developing EU administrative conditionality to the Western Balkans 
The fall of communism in the Western Balkans left the countries with poor policy designs and a 
low level of administrative capacity. This left the countries with a weak starting point for both 
economic and democratic development as a strong and stable public administration serves as a 
precondition to consolidate peace and stability, to complete constitutional settlements,  
economic growth as well as to ensure adequate implementation of legislation (SIGMA 2006: 1-
5). Consequently reform of the public administration has been a key priority of EU conditionality 
to the Western Balkans from the beginning. This is evident by the main priorities of the General 
Affairs Council of 1997 being the stabilization of the region by democratic and economic reform. 
This included institution-building, reform of the state and the public administration (European 
Commission 1997: 4). The introduction of the Stabilization and Association Progress (SAP) 
linked EU conditionality to the prospect of EU membership and was meant to show the will of 
the EU to in future accept the countries of the Western Balkan as members with full rights of EU 
member states. On the other hand, the process was considered as a means to support the 
effort of the countries to rebuild their economies and to reform their political system (Latifi 2009: 
3-4). A key part of SAP is the creation of a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) 
establishing a contractual relationship between each country concerned and the EU. The 
prospect of EU membership directs these conditions towards building of stable institutions, a 
consolidated democracy, adequate administrative institutions and applying the rule of law. This 
enables the implementation of the acquis communautaire (Salamun & Hallunaj 2008: 1-2).  
 
1.2 Analysing the impact of the EU 
A review of the existing literature in the field of EU administrative conditionality showed a lack of 
focus on the transfer of EU rules to the Western Balkans as well as a lack of focus on domestic 
politics and factors explaining the impact of the EU from a domestic point of view. According to 
Arolda Elbasani this causes the literature of the impact of the EU to be more assumed than 
proven. Elbasani questions the extent to which one can treat the EU as the independent factor 
given that the precise role of external actors cannot be studied in isolation from domestic 
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factors: Studying the role of the EU one necessary have to involve a discussion of domestic 
politics and intervening factors (Elbasani 2004: 25). This means that one cannot analyse EU 
conditionality without establishing the political and socio-economic situation to which the 
conditionality is applied as the development of European integration essentially depends on the 
domestic institutions and actors defining and implementing European policies (Salamun & 
Hallunaj 2009: 1). These arguments basses a case study at the centre of attention and in 
answering the research question Albania will provide a representative case study. This is further 
established in the following.   
 
1.2 Analysing the reform of the public administration in Albania 
The impact of EU administrative conditionality to the reform of the public administration in the 
Western Balkans will be exemplified by the case study of the rule adoption of the Civil Service 
Law (CSL) in Albania. Reform of the public administration has since the fall of communism been 
of central importance for Albania due to the need of establishing a managerial class, qualified 
decision-makers and competent civil servants, capable of managing the challenge of the 
transition period (Loughlin & Bogdani 2007: 47). The importance of building a stable, impartial 
public administration in Albania is stated of greatest importance in the achieving of the 
objectives in the EU undertaken commitments to help the Albanian government in strengthening 
the democracy, rule of law and to contribute to the political, economic and institutional stability 
in Albania (IPA 2008 National Programme for Albania: 3.1).  
 
The rule adoption of the Civil Service Law in 1999 put the milestones for the building of the 
public administration based on the principles of professionalism, political impartiality and equal 
chances for entering the civil service (IPA 2008 National Programme for Albania: 3.1). The law 
mandated transparent, competitive recruitment and selection procedures for all civil servants, 
established a new salary system and created the independent appeal body, the Civil Service 
Commission, to which any citizen can appeal a personal management action if grounds for 
believing that one has not been treated according to the rules established by the CSL are 
present (Cani 2009b: 25-29). However, although setting a milestone for the civil service in 
Albania, the law also entailed a range of shortcomings, first of all related to the implementation 
and definition of the law (SIGMA 2009: 2).  
 
Applying an analysis of EU administrative conditionality to this rule adoption as well as how it 
has been enhanced and implemented will provide information on the impact of the EU on the 
background of the shortcomings as well as how these have been addressed to reform the public 
administration in Albania. Such an analysis can be utilized to provide information on how EU 
administrative conditionality impacts the reform of the public administration in the entire region.  
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1.3 Aim of project 
The aim of this project is to analyse and reflect upon how EU administrative conditionality leads 
to reform of the public administration in the Western Balkans. An analysis of such provides 
information of the relationship between EU and the Western Balkans in an area of great 
importance for the economic and democratic development of the region as well as for the 
prospect of EU integration. The reform of the public administrations has been a key issue of the 
EU since the fall of communism in the Western Balkans and is considered a precondition of 
economic and democratic development. As the relationship between EU and the Western 
Balkans have been linked to the prospect of EU membership, the importance of reform of the 
public administration have increasingly grown in importance in order to enhance the capacity of 
the countries to implement the acquis communautaire of the EU. In order to analyse the impact 
of EU administrative conditionality to the reform of the public administration the rule adoption of 
the Civil Service Law in Albania will provide a case study as it is argued that the impact of the 
EU cannot be isolated from domestic factors. The case study will provide the background for 
answering the following research question: 
 
1.4 Research question 
How does EU administrative conditionality to the Western Balkans lead to reform of the public 
administration? 
 
1.5 Guiding questions 
As the case study is utilized to answer the research question, the following guiding questions 
are related to structure the case study and illustrate the path through which the research 
question will be answered:  
 
 Which factors of EU administrative conditionality impacts the rule adoption of the Civil 
Service Law in Albania? 
 
 How has the development of EU administrative conditionality impacted the rule adoption 
of the Civil Service Law? 
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2. Political and socio-economic situation of Albania   
 
The following section will outline the political and socio-economic situation in Albania. The 
chapter is organized as to introduce to the initial transition period first, followed by information of 
the political system and the polarization between the two main parties: The DP and the SP. This 
leads to a short introduction of the economic development and the importance of EU 
membership for the country.   
 
2.1 The fall of communism and the initial transition period 
The end of communism in Albania took place in three historic stages: the collapse of the  
communist regime in 1990, the end of the hegemonic one-party system with the election of the 
first coalition government in 1991 and lastly, the official end of communism with the first 
democratic election in 1992 (Bogdani & Loughlin 2007: 22). Under the communist regime 
Albania was completely cut off from any kind of economic, political and cultural link with the 
outside world and thus had a very poor socio-economic and political starting point in the 1990s 
(Bogdani & Loughlin 2007: 22-26). Albania was the least developed country in Europe with a 
low GDP per capita placing it in the African category of low-income countries (Fowkes 1999 in 
Elbasani 2004: 33). In light of this, the initial phase of transition, which showed to be full of 
progress, was to many a surprise. Within a few years democratic institutions were set up and a 
democratic framework introduced. Following this, Albania was accepted as a member of 
international political and financial institutions and further positive results were seen in the 
economy, as it started to move from the ruins of a central-planned economy to a market 
economy. However, all progress achieved was destroyed in 1997 with the collapse of pyramid 
schemes and the unrest which followed. Thereafter, Albania found itself in a complete freezing 
of state institutions, absence of public order with widespread violence and destruction. The 
consequence was political disruption and economic decline (Bogdani & Laughlin 2007: 36-40).  
2.2 The political system: polarization and exclusion of opposition 
Whilst almost all other states in the region in years following the 1997 crisis made demonstrable 
progress in economic and social development, Albania was set back by power struggles of the 
political elite causing polarization of politics by the two main political parties: The Democratic 
Party (DP) and the Socialist Party (SP). External issues such as the Kosovo War and the 2001 
uprising by Albanian groups in Macedonia presented further difficulties (O’Brennan & Gassie 
2009: 64).  
 
Albania is a parliamentary republic and the president is elected by two-thirds of the votes cast in 
the parliament. The president has limited power (Bogdani & Laughlin 2007: 181), and the 
Albanian political scene is instead dominated by the two main political parties (Bogdani & 
Laughlin 2007: 136). The polarization between the two parties has been the characteristic of 
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Albanian politics since the fall of communism (Bogdani & Laughlin 2007: 132-133 & Salamun & 
Hallunaj 2008: 5). The political debate is rather based on the personalities of the two leaders of 
the main political parties instead of debates of concrete policy issues of the political 
programmes.  The political styles are characterized by harsh political confrontations and power 
struggles instead of political dialogue and cooperation and opponents are rather considered 
enemies than legitimate political opponents (Bogdani & Laughlin 2007: 132-133), which 
especially is evident in the context of elections (Salamun & Hallunaj 2008: 5). In the years of 
pluralist democracy, the political parties have tried to exclude the opposition parties from the 
policy process, resulting in the opposition being weak and excluded from the political process. 
The changing oppositions have as a result boycotted the parliament and hold street protests 
and meetings (Bogdani & Laughlin 2007: 133). The current situation in Albania reflects precisely 
this.  
 
The first truly democratic parliamentary elections in 1992 lead the DP to an overwhelming 
majority of votes. In office, the DP leader Sali Berisha, initiated economic reforms and moved 
Albania out of its isolation. However, once in power, the DP abandoned the programme of 
political pluralism and started an erosion of democratic principles, first in the party itself and 
then in the entire public administration, resulting in the establishment of a highly centralized 
presidential system and a heavy concentration of power to the president, Berisha. As a result, 
the level of politicization and nepotism in the public administration was alarming: it was filled 
with members of the DP whilst supporters of the opposition parties were banned. The 1996 
elections were marked by a high-profile and strong campaign by the DP, whilst the SP was not 
allowed to present its campaign on TV or to hold rallies. The result was a highly contested 
election, in which the DP won 122 out of 140 seats, while SP only won five. The collapse of the 
pyramid schemes in 1997, and the following freezing of all state institutions, economic collapse 
and uprisings were followed by a fresh election. The election was won by the SP with an 
overwhelming majority. A broad-based coalition was created, leading the country to its 
economic and political recovery. However, once in power the SP began, as the DP had done 
five years earlier, to cleans-out servants from the public administration and other state-
controlled institutions due to their political ties with the DP (Bogdani & Laughlin 2007: 125-132).  
 
The SP government remained in power until the 2005 parliamentary election where the DP 
gained 56 of the 140 mandates, with its coalition gaining 80 seats (Salamun & Hallunaj 2008: 
3). Following the June 2009 parliamentary elections, where the DP remained in power, the 
Members of the SP boycotted the Parliament for six months. They are in the time writing only 
making their future presence in the Parliament dependent on the approval of two draft acts they 
have prepared, designed according to the party, to render the June 2009 elections fully 
transparent. Due to absence of agreement between the two parties of the composition of a 
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committee of inquiry into the June 2009 elections, the Parliament is in a deadlock and both 
parties have organized demonstrations (Albanian Daily News 27-04-2010).  
 
2.3 Economic development and NATO membership 
The recent years of Albanian political and economic development has been characterized by a 
strong GDP growth and restrained inflation (European Commission 2006: 16) and the official 
invitation to join NATO issued in March 2008 (Reuters 08-03-2008). The membership of NATO 
was hugely celebrated under the title of the “miracle of freedom” (MacDowell 2009). Meanwhile, 
though economic and politically Albania shows progress, the daily life of the Albanian citizen 
has not changed profoundly, evident by the fact that the purchasing power parities of the GDP 
per capita in 2008 were estimated at 25 per cent of the EU-27 average (European Commission 
progress Report 2009). Albania is therefore, as the rest of the Western Balkans, much 
dependent on funding from the EU and the EU strategy to the region includes massive financial 
assistance, making it by far the largest donor in the region (Website European Commission: 
Trade Balkans).  
 
2.4 The impact of the EU 
Although Albania’s political institutions for much of the transition period have lacked the capacity 
to tackle the deep seated problems encountered during the transition, such as chronic poverty, 
under-development and corruption, Albania has gradually drawn closer to the European Union 
(O’Brennan & Gassie 2009: 61). This was formally confirmed by the signing of the SAA on 12 
June 2006, which gave Albania a clear membership perspective. O’Brennan and Gassie argue 
that this should help to incentivize the Albanian politicians as they engage in the transposition 
and implementation of the acquis communautaire into Albanian law (2009: 61). However, 
Albania’s EU debate continues to be a prisoner of the political polarization between the DP and 
SP, and commitments on EU-related reform have frequently been sacrificed by local political 
disagreements, hindering EU integration (O’Brennan & Gassie 2009: 62). The political 
polarization does none the less not concern disagreement over EU membership: this is 
accepted by all parties from the left to the right of the political spectrum (Bogdani & Laughlin 
2007: 146) and EU membership has become a priority for all political actors (Elbasani 2004: 
37).   
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3. Public administration reform 
 
The following chapter will introduce to the importance of reform of the public administrations in 
the Western Balkans and specifically the reform of the public administration in regard to 
establishing a professional and independent civil service in Albania as this provides the case 
study of this project. This leads to the introduction of the legal framework of the Civil Service 
Law of 1999 and the scope of the law.  
 
3.1 Public administration reform in the Western Balkans 
Though the countries of the Western Balkan are different in a number of ways, the countries 
have all historically been weakly institutionalized and disposed to conflict. Communism 
weakened the state traditions in the entire region and cut according to the evaluation of SIGMA, 
the countries off from cultural notions, traditionally for example enabling respect for legality in a 
democratic, multi-ethnic context (SIGMA 2004: 6). The fall of communism left the countries with 
deficient management systems with low levels of professionalism and inappropriate structure 
and procedures. Poor policy designs and a low level of administrative capacity has in all the 
countries lead to inadequate implementation of legislation and the need to build a strong, stable 
public administration has been of central importance in order to avoid further inadequate 
implementation. On this background public administration reform is a key policy priority for all 
governments in the region and serves as a precondition to consolidate peace and stability, to 
complete constitutional settlements and economic growth (SIGMA 2004: 1-5) . The link between 
the countries and especially the link between the problems of reform of the public administration 
is more than anything a consequence of the approach of international donors such as the EU to 
the region. The approach provides for an artificial link between the countries of the Western 
Balkan, but also provides for many of the problems regarding public administration reform. 
Capacities to lead the necessary administrative reforms in the Western Balkans are according 
to an evaluation of SIGMA oriented towards formal legal change and suffer from weak political 
support (2004: 1). This is the case for the entire region because public administration reform to 
a large extent is donor-driven rather than driven by the domestic political interests. Hence, 
public administration reform is not owned by national politicians (SIGMA 2004: 1).  
 
In Albania reform of the public administration, and especially reform of the civil service, has 
been of central importance to establish a managerial class, qualified decision-makers and 
competent civil servants, capable of managing the challenge of the transition period (Loughlin & 
Bogdani 2007: 47). A stable and impartial public administration is furthermore considered 
capable of coping with the undertaken obligations of the SAA between EU and Albania (IPA 
2008 National Programme for Albania: 3.1) and hence is of central importance for the EU 
integration process for Albania 
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3.2 The Status of Civil Servants of 1999 
Civil service legislation in Albania has its background in the first attempts for establishing a civil 
service in Albania, with the approval of the first law on civil service in 1996, law no. 8095 of 21 
March 1996 “For Civil Service in the Albanian Republic” (Cani 2009b: 5). Due to reasons such 
as lack of experience, lack of capable institutions to manage the law and lack of political will to 
fully implement and manage the legislation, the institutions included in the law were never 
capable of operating the legislation and a proper civil service was not established (IPA 2008 
National Programme for Albania: chapter 3.1). Al public employees continued to be managed at 
the decisions of politicians or the political appointees, salaries varied considerably by position 
and public employees had no special due process protection. The current legal instrument 
regulating the civil service, the Civil Service Law (CSL) of 11 November 1999 (Law no. 8549 on 
the Status of Civil Servants) addressed these shortcomings (Cani: 2009b: 25). The CSL was 
needed for ensuring a clear understanding of the scope and field of implementation of the law. 
The law entered into force on 15 January 2000 and was complemented with nine by-laws, 
detailing the procedures established in the law (Cani 2009a: 5). The law put the milestones for 
the establishment of a civil service based on the principles of professionalism, political 
impartiality and equal chances for entering the civil service (IPA 2008 National Programme for 
Albania: 3.1). The law mandated transparent, competitive recruitment and selection procedures 
for all civil servants, established a new salary structure for civil servants and created the 
independent appeal body, the Civil Service Commission, to which any person can appeal a 
personal management action if grounds for believing that one have not been treated according 
to the rules established by the CSL (Cani 2009b: 25-29). Though addressing the shortcomings 
of the law of 1996 the law itself also entailed a range of shortcomings, being related to the need 
of further implementation and definition of the law (SIGMA 2008: 5).     
 
3.2.1 The scope of the law 
The Civil Service Law reduced the number of the public administrations subject to the civil 
service legislation immensely: Whilst the 1996 law included the public administration, excluded 
justice organs and armed forces, the 1999 law only included the Council of Ministers and 
ministries, municipalities and regions, the assembly, presidency and constitutional and legal 
independent organs, with the later only consisting of few according to the legal scheme (Cani 
2009a: 2-3). This means, that although that there is a focus of attention on this law of the EU 
and what it brings to the sustainability of the public administration, it needs to be considered that 
it in reality only applies to a limited number of employees (Cani 2009b: 25). Employees in the 
public administration is more often employed under the Labour Code, or enjoy the status of 
different political functions or special work statuses, in which the Civil Service Law does not 
apply (Cani 2009b: 19-20).   
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4. Methodology: reflections and limitations 
 
In the following it is clarified how the research question is answered. In answering the research 
question clarifications and delimitations are needed. The methodology of the project is first 
introduced as this provides information of the distinct way in which the research question will be 
answered. Following the temporal scope of the project is established, the theoretical framework 
and the data-collection introduced and limitations discussed, and lastly the design of the project 
illustrated.  
 
4.1 Methodology: Deciding on a case study 
When determining the questions that are most significant for a topic and gaining precision in 
formulating such questions Robert Yin argues that a review of the literature of the topic is a 
helpful approach (Yin 2003: 9). The review leading to this project has already been introduced 
in chapter 1, section 2 however a further reflection is necessary as it is of central importance for 
the research area and strategy of the project.  
 
When studying Europeanization as the external governance mode of the EU to non-member 
states one may focus on two different perspectives: the substance of the governance mode or 
the transfer of rules. The first perspective concerns the EU system of governance as a particular 
mode of network governance where the focus is on the substance of the governance mode and 
how and to what extent this impacts the process of decision-making of the external actors 
(Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2004: 662). Reviewing this literature it became clear that it has 
first and foremost been focused on the enlargement of the CEE. Scholars such as Heather 
Grabbe (2002), Othon Anastasakis & Dimitar Bechev (2003) and Frank Schimmelfennig & 
Ulrich Sedelmeier (2004 and 2005) have all analysed the substance of EU conditionality to the 
CEE countries, criticizing it of lacking a clear prospect of EU membership. Another focus has 
been the transfer of rules from the EU to the CEE, to which Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 
have developed a theoretical model capable of explaining the transfer of rules. This model, the 
External Incentive Model, takes both the factors of the EU strategy and the domestic politics 
and intervening factors into consideration (2004 and 2005). This have however not been applied 
to the case of the rule transfer in the framework of EU conditionality to the Western Balkans, the 
same being the case in regard to the rule transfer in the framework of EU administrative 
conditionality. Antoaneta Dimitrova (2005) applies the theory of Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 
to the case of administrative conditionality to the CEE countries and not the Western Balkans.  
 
As argued in chapter 1, section 2 the studying of the role of the EU necessary have to involve a 
discussion of domestic politics and intervening factors (Elbasani 2004: 25) and EU conditionality 
cannot be throughout analysed without establishing the political and socio-economic situation to 
18 
 
which the conditionality is applied as the development of European integration essentially 
depends on the domestic institutions and actors defining and implementing European policies 
(Salamun & Hallunaj 2009: 1). These arguments base a case study at the centre of attention 
and is further in line with the reflections of Robert Yin, who argues that one should use a case 
study method when deliberately interested in covering contextual conditions, believing that 
these might be highly important to the study (Yin 2003: 13). Choosing the research strategy of 
the case study is based on this background.  
 
4.1.1 A single case study 
The case study of the rule adoption of the CSL in Albania will provide a single case study for the 
answering of the research question. According to Yin a single case study is appropriate when it 
can be considered a representative case study (Yin 2003: 41), this being the case of the single 
case study of this project: Despite the differences amongst and within the countries of the 
Western Balkan, the way in which they are categorized by the EU provides for an artificially link 
between the countries (SIGMA 2004: 5) and enables an analysis of the region as a whole. 
Specifically this is evident in that EU administrative conditionality to the Western Balkans for the 
entire region first was based on the Regional Approach and later the Stabilization and 
Association Process (SAP), which are political frameworks equal to all countries of the region. 
The instruments of the two approaches are also the same: The Poland and Hungary: 
Assistance for Restructuring their Economies (PHARE), the European Partnership, the 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA), the Community Assistance for Reconstruction, 
Development and Stabilisation (CARDS) and Instrument of Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA). 
This is all instruments offered from the EU to the Western Balkans as part of the SAP. The 
specific conditions are different and based on the socio-economic and political context of each 
country, but are based on the same political, economic, social and administrative conditionality. 
Furthermore, as the reform of the public administration in the region as a consequence of being 
driven by international donors leads to similar problems of reform of the public administration in 
the entire region (SIGMA 2004: 5) it enables the use of the single case study of Albania to 
provide information of how EU administrative conditionality leads to public administration reform 
in the Western Balkans.  
 
4.1.2 Designing the single case study 
A research design is the logic that links the data to be collected to the initial questions of the 
study and hence ultimately to the conclusions to be drawn. The research design includes the 
collection and analysis of relevant data and is by Yin defined in five different components (Yin 
2003: 19) to which the reflections of Yin will be applied to the design of this case study. 
1. The research question 
2. Its propositions 
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3. It units of analysis 
4. The logic linking the data to the propositions 
5. The criteria for interpreting the findings   
The research question of this project allows for an analysis of which factors decide whether 
reform takes place and how the development of EU administrative conditionality impact the 
reform without being biased by the empirical data or a locked proposition, deciding how the 
empirical data is analysed. The research question and the guiding questions will be answered 
by the application of the External Incentive Model, which deductive approach is further reflected 
upon in chapter 4, section 2.4.  
The third component, the units of analysis, is related to the definition of what the case is. 
Defining the units of the analysis one should according to Yin be open to a redefinition as a 
result of discoveries arising during the data-collection as well as defining the specific boundaries 
of the case, enabling a definition of the beginning and end of the case (Yin 2003: 22-26). The 
analysis of EU administrative conditionality to the rule adoption of the CSL in Albania has been 
qualified by a redefinition of the unit of the analysis. In the data-collection, where the boundaries 
of the single case study also was defined, it was discovered, that EU administrative 
conditionality has developed to increasingly being linked to the prospect of EU membership 
whilst the rule adoption of the CSL in Albania in the same period can be defined of both formal 
and behavioural character. The formal adoption of EU rules entails the transposition of EU rules 
into national law or the establishment of formal institutions and procedures in line with EU rules 
whilst the behavioural adoption entails the extent to which behaviour is rule confirming, 
implemented and enhanced. The rule adoption of both may lead to institutionalization of EU 
rules at the domestic level (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2005: 6-7). This enabled a two-fold 
analysis: EU administrative conditionality to the formal rule adoption of the CSL before being 
linked to the prospect of EU membership and EU administrative conditionality to the behavioural 
rule adoption after being linked to EU membership.  
 
As the last components of the design of a case study, the components of the logic linking the 
data to the propositions and the criteria for interpreting the findings are closely related to the 
other components (Yin 2003: 28) and the need of an analytic strategy which will help one to 
threat the evidence fairly, produce compelling analytic conclusions and rule out alternative 
interpretations (Yin 2003: 111). The strategy of the analysis is introduced in section 2.4 of this 
chapter.  
 
4.2.3 Temporal scope 
The time period of this project offers the opportunity to analyse EU administrative conditionality 
before and after being linked to prospect of EU membership. This will enable the answering of 
the research question to its full extent, whilst providing valuable information of the impact of the 
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EU administrative conditionality to the Western Balkans. The temporal scope of the analysis is 
1996-2009. EU has offered Albania financial assistance since the fall of communism in 1991, 
but due to the case study analysing EU conditionality to Albania, the relationship between EU 
and Albania will be analysed as from 1996, due to the EU established the first political and 
economic conditions for Albania in the framework of its Regional Approach to the Western 
Balkans of 1996. The current legal instrument regulating the civil service in Albania, the Civil 
Service Law (CSL) of 11 November 1999 (Law no. 8549 on the Status of Civil Servants) was 
formally adopted in 1999. At this time the relationship between EU and Albania was part of the 
Regional Approach. Since 2000 EU conditionality has been linked to the prospect of EU 
membership by the adoption of the SAP in which the SAA is of special importance, establishing 
a contractual relationship between EU and Albania. Albania signed the SAA in 2006 and the 
agreement went into force in April 2009.  
 
4.2.4 Analytical strategy 
The analytical strategy takes point of departure in the propositions developed by the application 
of the theoretical framework, the External Incentive Model. The External Incentive Model is a 
rational bargaining model developed to account for the response and domestic rule adoption of 
none-member-states to the impact of the EU. The choice of the rational bargaining model is 
based on the findings of Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier of this model offering the most 
comprehensive framework to an analysis of EU conditionality. Moreover the model enables an 
analysis of the contextual conditions, which was of focus in the decision of the case study as a 
research strategy. The propositions developed by the application of the External Incentive 
Model will be utilized to guide the analysis of the impact of EU administrative conditionality to 
the rule adoption of the CSL and thus also to conclude on how EU administrative leads to 
reform of public administrations in the Western Balkans.  
 
The application of the External Incentive Model means that the answering of the research 
question is based on a rational-bargaining model. According to Sven Steinmo, the goal for 
scholars of rational choice institutionalism is to uncover the laws of political behaviour and 
actions based on the belief that when these laws are uncovered one can construct models that 
will predict political behaviour (2001: 2). Rationalists work deductive, hence the scholars look to 
the real world to test the model rather than to look at the real world and search for models that 
will explain the phenomenon they observes (Steinmo 2001: 2). Being a rational bargaining 
model, the External Incentive Model hence is to be tested empirically as to account for its level 
of explanation. In this project the model is utilized to the case of the rule adoption of the Civil 
Service Law of 1999 in Albania. Though working deductive and establishing a theoretical 
framework to be tested it has, as was explained above as part of the establishment of the case 
unit, been necessary to redefine the empirical data due to the findings of the data-collection.  
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4.2.5 Reflections of a rational-bargaining model 
The External Incentive Model provides the theoretical framework for answering the research 
question. Being a rational-bargaining model it stems from the school of rational choice 
institutionalism, which is focused on how institutions (understood as collective norms, rules and 
procedures) regulate or constrain behaviour by altering the cost-benefit calculations of rational 
actors (Sangiovanni 2006: 393). Actors are believed to be instrumentally rational, unitary and 
who have created the institutional framework because they benefit from the functions performed 
by it. Institutions reduce transaction costs; solve problems of incomplete contracting, 
enforcement and monitoring. Preferences of the actors are not affected by the institutions – 
instead the institutions provide constraints and opportunities for the strategic actors to reach 
their goals – thus they do not shape the goals (Sangiovanni 2006: 195). As the countries of the 
Western Balkan have not created the institutions of the EU, though have to transfer EU rules 
without having given a place in the process of decision-making, EU conditionality can be 
established as a strategy of asymmetry, as defined by several Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 
(2004: 665). EU conditionality is hence the institutional framework offered from EU to the 
Western Balkans, and though being asymmetrical, it regulates the behaviour of the Western 
Balkans by providing constraints and opportunities.  
 
4.2.6 Theoretical limitations and reflections 
The literature of Europeanization identifies several potential mechanisms in which the EU 
affects institutions, norms and practices inside and outside the member states. The 
mechanisms may be derived from sociological, rational choice or historical institutionalism. 
Whilst this study has chosen a theoretical framework derived from rational choice 
institutionalism, the impact of the EU could also be studied as the ideological influence of the 
EU in terms of the impact to ideas about the future and in providing an example of stability and 
prosperity (Dimitrova 2004: 174). Other applicable models are the social learning model, 
derived from social constructivism in which a logic of appropriateness is assumed, or the 
lesson-drawing model in which non-member states are believed to adopt EU rules as a 
response to domestic dissatisfaction with the status quo and hence without EU incentives or 
persuasion (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2004: 666-668).  
 
Analysing EU conditionality as the single independent factor affecting the transfer of EU rules in 
the area of public administration is based on the significance of the presence of EU and the 
extent to which the EU strategy affects the Western Balkans. However, rule adoption in the area 
of public administration may also be a consequence of the impact of other international actors, 
and especially the World Bank has been active in promoting public administration reform in 
Albania (IPA National Programme for Albania 2008: 3.1). The impact of other actors leading to 
the reform of the public administration has to be considered relevant. Due to limitations of the 
project this will not be analysed. A further theoretical limitation regards the definition of rule 
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adoption being of either of formal or behavioural character. Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier argue 
that rule adoption can also be regard to the creation of a discourse (2004: 663). Due to the 
limitations of this project, this definition is not included and reform hence refers solely to formal 
and behavioural rule adoption of EU conditions.  
 
4.3 Collection of data 
The empirical data collected can be divided into political and juridical documents and reports 
(primary sources) and scientifically conducted research (secondary sources). The primary 
sources have been supplemented with the secondary sources in regard to the finding of Yin of 
when basing a case study on an analysis of documents, it is important to supplement these with 
as many other sources. (2003: 87). The official documents, contracts press releases or other 
relevant documentation reflects what the actors are willing to communicate to the outside and 
there is no guarantee that it reflects the actual strategy pursued by neither these actors nor 
what has been discussed internally, in for example the EU.  
 
The collected data of EU administrative conditionality is based on the criteria of the documents 
need to establish the conditionality to Albania and specifically the administrative conditions 
regarding the establishment of a civil service. This has meant an analysis of data available, 
leading to a range of documents to be implemented in the analysis and a range of documents 
not to. The later is reflected upon in section 4.3.1. The data collected of EU administrative 
conditionality and instruments offered is first of all based on primary documents of the Regional 
Approach of 26 February 1996, the General Council Meetings of 29 April 1997, the Stabilization 
and Association Process (SAP), the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), European 
Partnership between EU and Albania, the financial instruments of the Poland and Hungary: 
Assistance for Restructuring their Economies (PHARE) (1991-2000), the Community Assistance 
for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation (CARDS) (2001-2006) and the Instrument of 
Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) (2007-2013). To establish EU administrative conditionality, the 
data has been supplemented with secondary sources. The data establishing the level of formal 
and behavioural rule adoption of the Civil Service Law in Albania is information of the annually 
offered progress reports of the European Commission to Albania, evaluations of international 
actors such as the World Bank and SIGMA and the NGO AKSES evaluation, written by Eralda 
Cani (2009b).  
  
4.3.1 Validity and reliability  
The use of multiple sources of evidence, referred to as triangulation of Yin, in terms of the 
utilization of both primary and secondary empirical data by this project, raises the validity of the 
project (Yin 2003: 97) whilst the outline of the empirical data utilized and the sufficient citation to 
the relevant elements of the empirical data raises the reliability (Yin 2003: 104-105) of the 
project. On the negative side, it has been outside the scope of this project to develop a case 
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study protocol. This would have made the data collection more transparent and enhance the 
reliability of the project (Yin 2003: 101). A range of agreements of both political, bilateral and 
contractual character have not been chosen as the analysis of these documents have shown 
that they do not include administrative conditionality in relation to the establishment of a civil 
service in Albania. Among these are the Stability Pact of 1996 and the Free Trade Area 
Agreement of the SAP. Another important limitation is the negotiations of the Schengen Visa 
Liberalization to Albania, which though having the potential to impact the reform process in 
Albania in general and also specifically the public administration reform, is not analysed as it 
does not entail administrative conditions to the Albania in the area of civil service legislation. A 
study protocol would enhance the credibility of the data collection, however as the validity of the 
project is high, based on the use of both primary and secondary literature, as well as the 
reliability of the project is also high, reliable on sufficient information and use of the empirical 
data, the project is considered of high validity and reliability.  
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4.4 Design of project 
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5. Theoretical framework 
 
In the following the theoretical framework and its components will be established and adapted to 
this case study when necessary. The chapter begins with placing the theoretical perspective in 
the larger context of the theories of Europeanization. This if of importance in order to 
understand the specific substance and perspective of the External Incentive Model. This is 
followed by an introduction to the perspectives of the External Incentive Model and its 
components.  
  
5.1 Europeanization 
Europeanization explains the impact of the EU on individual states, domestic institutions, 
policies, practices and structures. The term refers to the extent to which conditions of the EU 
have affected the policy agendas of the states as well as the extent to which EU practices, 
procedures and values have been embedded in the administrative structures of the EU member 
states. The process leads towards closer integration, policy convergence and homogenization 
(Bogdani & Laughlin 2007: 220). In the case of the integration of non-member states such as 
the countries of the Western Balkan, Europeanization is used to explain and analyse the impact 
of the EU on the transformation of the states towards democracy and a liberal market economy. 
This has been primarily analysed through the framework of EU conditionality, defined as the 
specific pattern of the relationship between EU and non-member states seeking membership of 
the EU (Trauner 2009: 776).  
 
5.2 Analytical strategy  
This project adopts the theory of the External Governance Model of Schimmelfennig & 
Sedelmeier. The model underpins EU conditionality as a mode of EU’s external governance and 
is developed by focusing on EU governance as the transfer of rules or standards from the EU to 
the non-member state. This is defined as the institutionalization of EU norm and rules 
(Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2004: 662). The model serves at the theoretical framework of 
this study in which the different components of EU administrative conditionality will be analysed. 
Based on the school of rational choice institutionalism the theoretical framework will be applied 
as to test its ability to explain the extent to which EU administrative conditionality to the rule 
adoption of the Civil Service Law in Albania has lead to institutionalization of EU rules, 
understood as reform of the public administration, before and after the prospect of EU 
membership, enabling the answering of the research question. 
 
5.3 The External Incentive Model 
The External Incentive Model is based on the assumption that EU’s external governance mainly 
follows a strategy of conditionality in which the EU sets the rules as conditions that the non-
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member states have to fulfil in order to get the EU rewards of assistance and institutional ties 
(Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2004: 663). The actors involved in this process are assumed to 
be strategic utility-maximizes, interested in maximizing their own interest, establishing the model 
as being a rationalist bargaining model. The outcome of a bargaining process depend solely on 
the relative bargaining power of the actors involved and the process involves the exchange of 
information, threats and promises. The analytic starting point of the bargaining process is a 
domestic status quo, where the domestic rules to some extent differs from the EU rules. This is 
described as the domestic equilibrium, reflecting the distribution of preferences and bargaining 
powers at the domestic level. The introduction of incentives for compliance with the EU rules 
affects the domestic status quo. This may either happen through intergovernmental bargaining 
or indirectly through the different empowerment of domestic actors. The adoption of the EU 
rules requires the decision of the target government, which is assumed to seek to balance EU, 
domestic and other international pressures in order to maximize its own political interests. In this 
context, the External Incentive Model is based on the assumption that a state adopts EU rules if 
the benefits of the EU rewards exceed the domestic adoption costs. This cost-benefit balance 
depends on the following factors: the determinacy of the conditions involved, the size and 
speeds of the rewards, the credibility of threats and promises and the size of the adoption costs 
(Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2004:662-664).    
 
5.3.1 Determinacy of conditions 
The general assumption of the model is that EU rules will not be adopted if the EU does not set 
any conditions for rewards. The determinacy of the conditions refers both to the clarity and 
formality of the EU conditionality: the clearer the implications and the more legalized its status 
is, the higher determinacy. Determinacy thus has an informal value of helping governments 
know exactly what they need to achieve in order to receive the rewards as well as being a 
signal to the government that it cannot manipulate the conditions to its advantage. The 
determinacy thus enhances the credibility of the conditionality (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 
2004: 664).  
 
5.3.2 Size and speed of rewards 
The size and speeds of the rewards is another important factor of the External Incentive Model. 
In the case of the EU conditionality to first the CEE countries’ and now the Western Balkans the 
argument is that the promise of enlargement should be more powerful than the promise of 
association or assistance. The impact of the EU should thus accordingly be more powerful to 
candidate countries than to potential candidate countries. Furthermore, adoption of EU rules is 
assumed to become more likely the closer the day of the EU enlargement decision gets 
(Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2004: 665). Size and speed of rewards will in this project also 
entail the size and speed of financial assistance, based on the findings of the Western Balkans 
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is greatly dependent on financial assistance from the EU. The argument is that the impact of the 
EU should be more powerful when progress is linked to opening of further financial assistance.  
 
5.3.3 Credibility of conditions 
A strategy of reinforcement by reward requires the superior bargaining power of the external 
agency and the certainty about the conditional payments for effective external governance. The 
superior bargaining power of the external agency means that the EU must be able to withhold 
the rewards and be less interested in giving the reward than the target government is in 
receiving it (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2004: 665). In the case of the enlargement of EU 
and the relationship with the CEE countries, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier argue that the 
condition is present in this relationship due to the asymmetry in favour of the EU: The countries 
of the CEE are heavily dependent on the EU market and benefit much more from accession 
than the EU member states, whereas the CEE countries are only of a marginal importance to 
the EU market (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2004: 665). This argument may very well be 
adapted to the relationship of the countries of the Western Balkan and the EU, as these 
countries have been heavily dependent on the assistance of the EU and access to the EU 
market since the fall of communism (European Union Website: Trade Western Balkans).   
 
On the other hand, the EU needs to withhold the rewards, at a low cost to it. The higher the 
costs of the rewards are to the EU, the more unlikely the payment to the target state and on this 
basis, association and assistance has been more credible rewards than accession. 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier argue that enlargement involves such substantial costs to the 
EU that these costs are likely to exceed the marginal benefits of the member states 
(Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2004: 665). However, one also needs to take into consideration 
that the credibility of the promises in enlargement conditionality increases over time as the 
credibility of threats decrease. This argument reflects that enlargement involves costly, long-
term negotiations and preparations, as well as a restructuring of EU institutions and policies, 
and the more the pre-accession process advances, the larger the costs are if the process is 
broken off or postponed in order to sanction a candidate state (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 
2004: 665-666). Other factors that affect the credibility of the rewards are the consistency of 
which the EU allocates the rewards and the so-called cross-credibility must be low, which 
means that target governments have few other sources offering comparable benefits at lower 
adjustments costs (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2004: 666).  
 
Adapting the impact of EU administrative conditionality to the External Incentive Model, 
Dimitrova stresses the importance of considering the credibility of the administrative 
conditionality. If a non-member state is to adopt the rules of the administrative conditionality, 
this has to be considered sufficiently important in the overall set of EU conditions (Dimitrova 
2005: 73). EU conditionality covers a range of issues, all of which have different weights and 
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importance ascribed to them over time. One can treat the separate sets of conditions as either 
partial conditionalities or sub conditions. When analysing the credibility of EU administrative 
conditionality, one therefore needs to define EU administrative conditionality in terms of its 
credibility related to other conditionalities (Dimitrova 2005: 79).     
 
5.3.4 Veto players and adoption costs 
The last factor of the model is the effectiveness of the conditionality. According to 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier this depends on the preferences of the government and those 
of other veto players, if any. This argument is based on the assumption that the adoption is very 
costly, because it otherwise would also have taken place in the absence of EU conditionality. 
The adoption of the rules and therefore accepting the conditions hence depends on the size of 
the domestic adoption costs and the distribution among the domestic actors. Given that the EU 
rules have to be adopted and implemented by the governments, the effectiveness depends on 
the government and other actors, whose agreement is necessary for a change in the status quo 
(Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2004: 666). The actors thus need to be united or close to a 
consensus, otherwise the adopted EU rules may end up being disregarded, contested and 
changed after accession, or simply remain empty frameworks. Thus, if there is a fit between the 
EU conditions and the reform consensus, successful institutionalization is likely (Dimitrova 2002: 
177). A further perspective is that the difficulty of a change of the status quo changes with the 
number of veto players with significant interests involved (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2004: 
666).  
 
With the External Incentive Model introduced the rule adoption of the CSL in Albania will be 
analysed. Due to the two-fold definition of rule adoption being of both formal and behavioural 
character, the analysis is divided into two chapters: the formal rule adoption and the behavioural 
rule adoption. In the following chapter is the behavioural rule adoption analysed.   
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6. The formal rule adoption of the CSL in Albania  
 
In the following chapter the formal rule adoption of the Civil Service Law in 1999 is analysed by 
the application of the External Incentive Model. This enables the analysis of how EU 
administrative conditionality to the formal rule adoption of the CSL in 1999 results in reform of 
the public administration. EU administrative conditionality will be defined by a descriptive 
analysis of the EU Regional Approach and the conditionality established by the General Affair 
Council of 29 April 2009. The instruments of the conditionality is hereafter analysed by the 
application of the External Incentive Model to decide on which factors of EU administrative 
conditionality affects the reform of the public administration. This answers partly the first 
research question: which factors of EU administrative conditionality determine rule adoption of 
the Civil Service Law in Albania? This needs to be further complimented with the findings of the 
analysis of the behavioural rule adoption. In the following EU administrative conditionality is first 
defined. 
 
6.1 EU and Albania relations: 1996 - 1999  
EU assistance to Albania became from 26 February 1996 linked to the EU Regional Approach, 
adopted at the General Affairs Council of same date. The approach provided a framework for 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FYR) and the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) (General Affairs Council of 26 February 
1996). At the General Affairs Council of 29 April 1997 the main priorities of the approach were 
established as the stabilization of the region together with economic and democratic 
development; this included institution-building, reform of the state and the public administration 
(General Affair Council 29 April 1997). As to achieve the priorities the EU established clear 
political and economic conditionality for the development of bilateral relations with the countries 
concerned (General Affairs Council of 29 April 1997). The General Affairs Council of 1997 
established the financial assistance of the PHARE programme between EU and the Western 
Balkans (General Affairs Council  of 29 April 1997)  which mainly was focused on infrastructure 
support, which received around 60 per cent of the funds, (Hoffmann 2005: 63). EU 
administrative conditionality is not specified in further details in neither the General Affair 
Council of 26 February 1996 or 29 April 1997. It instead becomes evident in the conditionality 
reports, monitoring and evaluating the progress of the individual countries, which is analysed in 
section 6.2.1.  
 
6.2 Applying the External Incentive Model 
In order to analyse the formal rule adoption of the Civil Service Law of 1999, the theory of the 
External Incentive Model is utilized. The four factors of the model: the credibility of the 
conditions, the determinacy, the size and speed of the rewards and the role of veto players and 
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adoption costs will first be analysed to the instruments of EU administrative conditionality and 
the domestic politics and intervening factors and hereafter applied to the rule adoption of the 
CSL in Albania.  
 
6.2.1 Determinacy 
Deciding on the impact of EU conditionality one needs according to the External Incentive 
Model to decide on the factor of the determinacy of the conditions. This refers to the clarity as 
well as the formality of the EU conditionality: the clearer the implications and the more legalized 
its status is, the higher determinacy. Deciding on the determinacy of EU administrative 
conditionality of the Regional Approach, the conditionality as formulated in the text of the 
General Affairs Council of 29 April 1997, establishing the conditionality of the Regional 
Approach of the General Affairs Council of 26 March 1996 will be considered.  
 
Within the General Affairs Council of 29 April 1997 it is stated that the EU has agreed to 
establish, within the framework of the Regional Approach, political and economic conditions for 
the countries of Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, FYR, FYROM and Albania. The conditions are 
supposed to form the basis for a coherent policy of the development of bilateral relations in the 
field of trade, financial assistance and economic cooperation as well as contractual relations 
with the countries (General Affairs Council 26 April 1997). The policy includes the financial 
assistance of the PHARE programme, which is dependent on compliance with the democratic 
reforms and progress towards generally accepted standards of human rights and minorities. 
The elements of the democratic principles require the separation of powers (government, 
administration, justice) whilst the elements for human rights and rule of law entail the protecting 
of the law (General Affairs Council 26 April 1997). All of these conditions are related to the 
building of a strong and stable public administration, and are thus also related to the formal rule 
adoption of a functioning Civil Service Law in Albania. However, the conditions are related to 
the democratic conditionality and the General Affairs Council of 26 April 1997 did not establish 
direct EU administrative conditionality to Albania. Therefore, the analysis of the dependency of 
EU administrative conditionality will be analysed in terms of the dependency on the democratic 
conditionality, whilst the lack of direct administrative conditionality will be analysed to decide of 
the credibility of the conditionality.  
 
The dependency on the democratic and economic conditionality will be considered low, first of 
all due to the Regional Approach being of political character therefore not establishing a 
contractual relationship between Albania and the EU. The approach did furthermore not specify 
the reform priorities or establish the conditionality to Albania lowering the determinacy as the 
Albanian government cannot know whether all conditions apply for them or to which they need 
to respond first.  
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The conditionality reports address these shortcomings by evaluating the level of process by 
each country. In the Conditionality Report of 30 March 1998 to Albania the embarking of the 
government of institutions and public administration was welcomed (European Commission 
March 1998: 24) whilst the Conditionality Report of 19 October 1998 stressed that substantial 
progress with regard to institutional development and reform of public administration was still 
required (European Commission October 1998: 24). The Conditionality Report of 17 May 1999 
directly pointed to the need of setting up a Civil Service Commission and the approval of an 
updated strategy for the reform of the public administration and state institution (European 
Commission May 1999: 25). Hence, the reports reveal on one side that administrative 
conditionality is part of the democratic conditionality, whilst on the other side only briefly define 
the administrative conditions. The conditionality reports do not offer the Albanian government 
precise details of reform priorities or further describe the elements of the administrative 
conditionality, to ensure that the Albanian government knows how it needs to proceed in order 
to continue the progress of negotiations and receive the financial assistance of the PHARE 
programme. Overall, the dependency of EU administrative conditionality is low and hence a 
formal rule adoption of the CSL cannot be expected by the impact of this factor alone.  
 
6.2.2 Credibility of conditions  
The External Incentive Model is based on the assumption that EU strategies of conditionality 
are reinforced by rewards. This requires the superior bargaining power of the external agency 
and the certainty about the conditional payments. In the case of the governance mode in 
question, established by the General Council Affairs of 26 February and the General Affairs 
Council of 29 April 1997, it is of central importance that neither entailed references to prospect 
of EU membership. The absence of a clear EU strategy with visible benefits such as eventual 
membership runs according to Othon Anastasakis & Dimitar Bechev counter to the main 
objectives of EU conditionality, geared towards reconciliation, reconstruction and reform of the 
Western Balkans. The application of EU conditionality has therefore encountered problems in 
the Western Balkans (Anastasakis & Bechev 2003: 3). The lack of prospect of EU membership 
lowers the credibility by lowering the superior bargaining power of EU, when EU membership is 
understood as the most valuable reward possible. The lack of prospect of EU membership in 
the Regional Approach will from this perspective be concluded to affect the credibility of EU 
administrative conditionality, and hence only a weak effect on the reconciliation, reconstruction 
and reform, as formulated by Anastasakis & Bechev, can be expected. The perspective will be 
further analysed in the section of the size and speed of reward.  
    
Another aspect of the credibility regards the weight and importance of the particular 
conditionality of interest. According to Antoaneta Dimitrova, the separate parts of conditions 
linked to EU enlargement have to be treated as partial conditionalities or subconditions, the 
weight and importance decided by the potential of the conditions to stop or considerably delay 
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the progress of accession (Dimitrova 2005: 80-81). Adapting the argument to the EU strategy of 
the Regional Approach, due to the lack of prospect of EU membership, the weight and 
importance will be understood as the potential of this condition to stop or delay the negotiations 
of bilateral relations and the continuing financial assistance. The potential of EU administrative 
conditionality to stop or delay the process of negotiations and the continuing financial 
assistance will be concluded low. This is based on EU administrative conditionality only being 
part of the democratic conditionality of the Regional Approach, which furthermore suffers from 
only offering limited information of the EU conditions and not offering a list of priorities to the 
Albanian authorities. The ability of EU administrative conditionality to impact the formal adoption 
of the Civil Service Law is thereby still considered low.  
 
6.2.3 Size and speeds of rewards 
The size and speeds of the rewards is another important factor of the External Incentive Model 
and is again related to the argument of the promise of enlargement should be more powerful 
than the promise of association or assistance. The credibility of EU administrative conditionality 
to Albania as linked to the negotiations of bilateral relations has above been argued to be low. 
However the argument needs further development to account for the socio-economic and 
political situation in Albania and the size and speeds of rewards in regard of EU assistance and 
negotiations dependent on the context and not only the substance of the EU strategy will be 
analysed in order to decide on their importance. The argument lead forward is that financial 
assistance as well as further development of trade agreements is of central importance when 
considering the socio-economic situation in Albania in the period in question, as introduced in 
chapter 2.  
 
During the period 1991-1997, EU assistance to Albania amounted to EUR 318 million, 
predominantly allocated for emergency and food aid, whilst additional EUR 190 million in grants 
were allocated to support the economic reform process (Hoffmann 2005: 60). However, in light 
of the severe institutional and economic instability, caused by the fall of the pyramid schemes in 
1997, the EU reallocated the funds and reduced the overall number of support areas. 
Accordingly, the EU revised its Multi-Annual Indicative Program (MIP), which lays the details of 
the key areas for support, and increasingly focused its support for public administration, which 
rose from 12.1 per cent to 19.4 per cent (Hoffmann 2005: 60-62). The assistance to Albania 
amounted in this period to EUR 246 million. In terms of negotiations and signing of bilateral 
agreements, Albania and EU relations were developed by Albania benefitting from the 
Autonomous Trade Preferences with the EU in 1999 and the extension of duty-free access to 
the EU market for products from Albania in 2000 (European Commission Website: EU-Albania 
Relations). Therefore during the period in question, Albania benefited greatly from both financial 
assistance, as well as by the establishment of bilateral agreements ensuring its access to the 
EU market. Although the EU strategy was not linked to the prospect of EU membership, the size 
33 
 
and speed of the rewards should be considered an important factor and raise the prospect of 
the impact of EU administrative conditionality influencing the government to take the necessary 
measures of demands for reform of the public administration in order to continue receive 
financial assistance and negotiate bilateral agreements. This is further enhanced by the fact that 
the EU shifted focus in light of the severe crisis in 1997 and enhanced its financial assistance to 
reform of the public administration. This argument will be further developed in order to analyse 
the role of veto players and domestic adoption cost in more detail, in which the importance of 
the socio-economic and political situation will be further reflected on.  
 
6.2.4 Veto players and adoption costs 
So far, the EU administrative conditionality for the formal rule adoption is analysed in regard to 
the composition of the conditionality in question and how it can impact the formal rule adoption 
of the Civil Service Law. To analyse the impact of EU administrative conditionality, and to what 
extent the argument of the analysis led forward so far will indeed have the expected outcome, it 
is necessary to develop the domestic equilibrium, due to this is established of central 
importance for the effect of the EU conditionality. In the period leading to the formal adoption of 
the CSL Albania had suffered from a total freeze of state institutions and economic collapse by 
the crisis of 1997. The situation caused the need to rebuild the institutions and economy of the 
country and the formal rule adoption may on this background be a natural reaction of the 
government striving to solve the situation of the country and rebuild the public administration as 
a consequence. However, during the period in question, Albanian politics was still characterized 
by strong political interference in the public administration, which continued to be the case when 
the Socialist Party (SP) by the 1997 election gained power for the first time: All social servants 
with political ties to the Democratic Party (DP) were cleansed out from the public administration. 
This is further described in chapter 2, section 2. The situation of political interference of the SP 
in the period before rule adoption of the CSL is of great importance as the interference took 
place in the framework of the 1996 law. This shows the need of adopting a more 
comprehensive framework, which has been established, was indicated by the EU in the 
Conditionality Reports. However, adopting a more comprehensive framework will according to 
the logic of the External Incentive Model only take place if it exceeds the adoption costs of the 
SP by not doing so. As the political actions of the SP do not create any basis for believing that 
the SP would change its behaviour if not met with comprehensive EU rewards for doing so, the 
factors of EU administrative conditionality as analysed above is of central importance and they 
will decide whether rule transfer will take place or not.  
 
6.2.5 Summery 
It is above established that there exist a misfit between the EU conditions for reform of the 
public administration and the domestic equilibrium. Adaptation pressure in such a situation is 
high (Dimitrova 2005: 76) and depends on the factors of the EU administrative conditionality. 
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The factors of determinacy and credibility was concluded to be low when linked to the lack of 
prospect of EU membership and the lack of clarity of the EU administrative conditions, whilst the 
factors of credibility and size and speed of the rewards as linked to financial assistance and 
bilateral agreements, found to be of central importance to the Albanian government, is 
concluded to be high. In the following section the conclusions will be tested to their ability to 
analyse the rule adoption of the Civil Service Law in Albania.  
 
6.3 The formal rule adoption of the Civil Service Law 
The current legal instrument regulating the civil service is Law no. 8549 on the Status of Civil 
Servants of 11 November 1999 (Cani 2009b: 25). The law is also called the Civil Service Law. 
The purpose of the law is to create a professional, stable and efficient civil service, which entails 
the establishment of uniform regulations on conditions and procedures for entering the public 
service and career advancement (Law no. 8549 on the Status of Civil Servants: Article 1.1). The 
law determines the framework of the administration of the civil service and further regulates the 
relationship between the civil servants and institutions relevant to the law (Law no. 8549 on the 
Status of Civil Servants: Article 1.2). The law also established the Department of Public 
Administration (DoPA), responsible of developing, implementing and overseeing the policies on 
the civil services and the Civil Service Commission, an independent institution responsible for 
the management of the civil service and all institutions falling within the scope of the law and 
acting as the administrative resort for appeals in matters related to civil servants (Law no 8549 
on the Status of Civil Servants: Article 4). However, although setting a milestone for the civil 
service in Albania, the law also entailed a range of shortcomings, first of all related to the 
implementation and definition of the law (SIGMA 2009: 2). The Civil Service Law further 
reduced the number of the public administrations subject to the civil service legislation 
immensely (Cani 2009a: 2-3). The precise details of this are further described in chapter 3, 
section 3. The reduction is according to Eralda Cani a result of Albania not being able to 
manage a large scale of civil servants reduced it to a minimum in the central government but 
not for the local government (Cani 2009a: 3).  
 
6.3.1 Conclusions of the formal rule adoption 
EU administrative conditionality linked to the Regional Approach did not lead to sufficient reform 
of the public administration in Albania. Though the formal rule adoption of the CSL addressed a 
range of shortcomings of the law of 1996 and has been defined as putting the milestones for the 
establishment of a professional, independent civil service in Albania it also reduced the scope of 
the law whilst entailing a range of shortcomings itself. The situation was to some degree 
expected, as it by the analysis of EU administrative conditionality was concluded that the misfit 
between the enhancement and implementation of the law of 1996 and the EU conditions did not 
mean that adoption would take place, due to the low level of determinacy and clarity of EU 
administrative conditionality as well as the actions of the domestic political actors in the 
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framework of the law of 1996 did not lead one to believe that a sufficient law would be adopted. 
The analysis did however also suggest that if a rule adoption was likely, it would be explained 
by the size and speed of the rewards of the EU, as the role of the EU as the biggest donor in 
Albania was of importance to the country in its transition period and further in the aftermath of 
the 1997 crisis and would impact the Albanian government to reform the public administration.    
 
Albeit the formal rule adoption of the CSL at first seems explainable by the later conclusion as 
the other arguments do not lead to conclusions of rule adoption, and in which the size of the 
financial assistance must have impacted the Albanian government to adopt the law, such an 
argument does not account for the many shortcomings of the law. According to Cani one needs 
to find the explanation in regard to the domestic adoption costs. The reduction of the scope of 
the law was a consequence of the central government institutions hold most of the powers (tax, 
customs, health, legalization etc.) and the possibility for the political actors to benefit financially 
if all of these sectors were considered civil service, would be low (Cani 2009a: 5). The argument 
of Cani is hence that the interests of the government was of such importance that the law was 
decided to be reduced to ensure that it would not be limited by reform of the public 
administration, even though this also consisted of shortcomings in regard to the definitions and 
implementation of the law.   
 
The reduction of the scope of the law has great importance when deciding on the impact of the 
EU administrative conditionality. When deciding to reduce the scope of the law, the Albanian 
government turned its back to the progress of reform of the public administration which already 
had taken place by the adoption of the 1996 law. The later was according to Cani based in 
conformity with the tendencies in civil service legislation in EU member states of providing the 
status of civil servants to the majority of the public administration (Cani 2009a: 4). The EU 
administrative conditionality to the rule adoption of the CSL in Albania did therefore not only 
lead to only a rule adoption consisting of several shortcoming, but also to a reduction of the law 
in contrast with the EU standards already recognized by the adoption of the law of 1996.  
 
6.3.2 Main arguments 
The factor of domestic political interests of the Albanian government to influence the public 
administration and the civil service is concluded to first and foremost determine whether reform 
of the public administration in Albania takes place within EU administrative conditionality linked 
to the Regional Approach. The argument is based on the fact that whilst capable of adopting the 
law of 1996 in conformity with EU tendencies the partial rule adoption and the reduction of the 
scope of the law provides a clear sign of the government not having interest in adopting a 
sufficient framework. The EU administrative conditionality did not alter the interest of 
government sufficiently. This is concluded on the background of the low determinacy and clarity 
of the EU administrative conditionality.  
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7. The behavioural rule adoption of the CSL in Albania   
 
In the previous chapter the External Incentive Model was applied to the analysis of EU 
administrative conditionality to the rule adoption of the Civil Service Law in Albania of 11 
November 1999. It was established that the law entailed a range of shortcomings and only led 
to a limited reform of the public administration. As the EU administrative conditionality changed 
with the introduction of the SAP in 2000 it is relevant to analyse the impact the revised EU 
administrative conditionality had on the behavioural adoption and whether this has generated a 
higher level of reform of the public administration and by such the establishment of a 
professional, independent and merit-based civil service in Albania. This will provide the full 
answering of the first guiding research question: which factors of EU administrative 
conditionality determine rule adoption of the Civil Service Law in Albania? It further provides for 
the answering of the second guiding research question: How has the development of EU 
administrative conditionality impacted the rule adoption of the Civil Service Law in Albania?  
 
In the following section the EU administrative conditionality between 2000 and 2009 and its 
instruments are introduced to define the revised EU administrative conditionality. The External 
Incentive Model is applied and EU conditionality analysed. These conclusions are applied to the 
empirical data of the behavioural rule adoption of the CSL in Albania and the rule adoption 
analysed.  
 
7.1 EU and Albania relations: 2000 - 2009 
Whilst the relationship between the EU and Albania in the former chapter was described as 
being one of conditionality linked to bilateral agreements and cooperation agreements, the 
relationship between EU and Albania changed considerably in the year of 2000, with the 
implementation of the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP). At the Feira European 
Council in June 2000, the Heads of EU States and Governments confirmed the prospect of the 
Western Balkans as potential candidate countries (European Union Feira Summit 2000) and the 
Zagreb Summit in November 2000 sealed the SAP (Hoffmann 2005: 65).  
 
The SAP was launched as a consequence of the lack of a positive reaction from the Western 
Balkans to the incentives provided by the EU Regional Approach (European Commission: 
Operational Conclusions of 26 May 1999). As a response the EU repeated the conditions and 
instead tied them to the negotiation and conclusion of a Stabilization and Association 
Agreement (SAA), in which prospect of EU membership became dependent on the progress 
made in implementing this agreement (Zagreb Summit 24 November 2000: Final Declaration). 
The countries of the Western Balkan agreed to a set of objectives and conditions, whilst the EU 
offered the prospect of accession on the basis of the Treaty on European Union and the 
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Copenhagen conditions (Hoffmann 2005: 65-66).  The Copenhagen Conditions of 1993 are 
designed to minimize the risk of new member states becoming politically unstable or 
economically burdensome as well as to ensure that the applicant countries are ready to meet all 
EU rules (Grabbe 2002: 251). According to Anastasakis and Bechev, this reflects that 
conditionality and accession are two sides of same coin, and the criteria of EU conditionality 
representing more than anything else, the hurdles on the way to EU-integration (Anastasakis & 
Bechev 2003: 5). The Copenhagen Conditions of 1993 read: 
 
1. Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of 
minorities.  
2. Membership requires the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity 
to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union.  
3. Membership presupposes the candidate’s ability to take on the obligations of membership 
including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union (Copenhagen 
European Council 1993).  
 
At the Thessaloniki summit in June 2003, the EU confirmed its support for the European 
perspective of the Western Balkans (EU-Western Balkan Press release 2003). The SAP is built 
on four building blocks, developed to support the progress of the accession countries in meeting 
the EU conditions for membership (Zahariadis 2007: 13). The four building blocks are the SAA, 
bilateral free trade agreements between all countries of the SAP, trade preferences between the 
EU and each country and financial assistance. The SAA and the financial instruments will in the 
following section be introduced as to enable the analysis of the impact of EU administrative 
conditionality to the behavioural rule adoption of the CSL. A further important factor, the 
European Partnership, will be introduced. For a description of the empirical data-collection and 
a description of choosing not to analyse the conditions of the instruments of the trade 
preferences and the bilateral agreements, see chapter 4, section 3. 
  
7.1.1 The SAA between EU and Albania 
A key element of the SAP is the establishment of a contractual relationship between the 
accession country and the EU: the SAA (Hoffmann 2005: 59). The agreement will be 
established as soon as certain political and economic conditions are met with the aim of 
establishing a Free Trade Area between the EU and the countries of the Western Balkan. The 
SAA is thus meant to bring the Western Balkans closer to standards which apply in the EU, and 
focus attention on respect for key democratic principles as well including core elements of the 
EU single market (Hoffmann 2005: 59). The SAA covers a wide range of areas from political 
cooperation to the establishment of a free trade area (SAA Albania - EU 2009) and the Albanian 
authorities are required to undertake a gradual harmonization of legislation in the areas 
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covered. The Association shall be fully realized within a maximum period of 10 years (SAA 
Albania - EU 2009: Article 6).  
 
During the Zagreb Summit in November 2000, the EU decided to establish a High Level 
Steering Group (HLSG) between the EU and Albania. The steering group’s main task was to 
support Albania in its preparations for the negotiating of the SAA and evaluating the 
developments in Albania. The HLSG found that the Commission should continue the 
negotiations of an SAA with Albania, albeit it was not yet in a position to meet the obligations of 
the SAA (Hoffmann 2005: 66). Negotiations for an SAA between the EU and Albania were 
officially opened on 31. January 2003 (Hoffmann 2005: 66-67) however, substantial progresses 
towards the EU objectives were not made during more than three years of negotiations. During 
the seventh round of negotiations in November 2003, the EU warned Albania that the slow 
progress put the SAA negotiations at risk (Vurmu 2008: 23-27). The SAA between Albania and 
the EU was signed on 12 June 2006 and six months later its trade related provisions, the 
Interim Agreement, entered into force (Vurmu 2008: 25). The SAA went into force on 1 April 
2009 replacing the temporally Interim Agreement. On 28 April 2009 Albania submitted its 
membership application (Latifi 2009: 6).  
 
7.1.2 European Partnership 
Another important agreement between EU and the Western Balkans is the European 
Partnership. Through the European Partnership the EU provides guidance to the Albanian 
authorities on reform priorities (Grabbe 2002: 255). The first European Partnership between EU 
and Albania was initiated on 14 June 2004 (European Partnership of 14. June 2004) whilst the 
current European Partnership to Albania is dated from February 2008, updating the second one 
on the basis of the findings of the Progress Report on Albania of 2007 (European Partnership of 
18 February 2008: Annex 1). The priorities listed in the European Partnership are divided into 
short-term priorities, expected to be accomplished within one to two years and medium-term 
priorities, expected to be accomplished within three to four years. The priorities concern both 
the adoption and implementation of legislation (European Partnership of 18 February 2008 
Annex 1).  
 
7.1.3 The financial assistance of the SAP 
The financial assistance from the EU to Albania has been transferred through three different 
programs: the Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies (PHARE) 
programme (1991-2000), the Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and 
Stabilisation (CARDS) programme (2001-2006) and the programme through which Albania is 
now receiving financial and structural aid, IPA - the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance 
(O’Brennan & Gassie 2009: 69). Until 1997 the EU did not have an explicit instrument for its 
pre-accession strategy. Instead the PHARE aid programme, covering countries which by then 
39 
 
had applied for EU-membership, as well as the non-applicant countries (Albania, Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Herzegovina) which was demand-driven, allowed 
governments to form their own request (Grabbe 2002: 258). In the period in which EU 
administrative conditionality has been linked to a prospect of EU membership, EU assistance 
has been covered by the instruments of the CARDS-programme and the IPA. These are 
introduced below.  
 
7.1.4 The CARDS-programme 
With the adoption of the SAP in 2000, the EU introduced a new pre-accession instrument, the 
CARDS-programme. The programme underpinned the objectives and mechanisms of the SAP 
and the SAA. As countries moved closer to EU membership assistance of the CARDS-
programme was increasingly focused on supporting  reform and institution-building necessary to 
implement and enforce the obligations of the SAA (Hoffmann 2005: 62). Albania became 
eligible for CARDS assistance in 2001. The CARDS-programme marked a shift in the EU 
assistance, which became adjusted to fit the conditions of the SAA and to support areas of 
importance for the implementation of a SAA. While EU assistance during the PHARE 
programme was mainly focused on infrastructure support, which received around 60 per cent of 
the funds, focus shifted to public administration in the period between 2002-2004, becoming the 
single most important area of support (Hoffmann 2005: 63). The EU considers the assistance of 
the CARDS programme to be by far the most important source of financial and technical 
support for reconstruction in the Western Balkans. The support was found to ensure a linkage 
with the political perspective of the SAP, but also entailed a range of shortcomings related to 
specific sectors, one of these being public administration. To address the shortcomings, the EU 
developed a new instrument for pre-accession (Szelmér 2008: 13). This is introduced below. 
 
7.1.5 The IPA-programme 
In August 2006 the Council of the European Union adopted Regulation (EC) No 1085/2006. 
With effect from 1 January 2007 the instrument has replaced all previous financial assistance to 
potential candidate and candidate countries of the EU (IPA 2006: Article 1-4) and IPA will thus 
be the financial instrument supporting Albania in meeting the political, economic and acquis-
related criteria for membership of EU. As a potential candidate country Albania is eligible for 
funds from two of IPA’s five components: The component of Transition Assistance and 
Institution Building as well as the component of Cross-Border Cooperation. The other 
components only available for candidate countries are Regional Development, Human 
Resources and Rural Development (Szelmér 2008: 9). In concrete terms the management of 
the IPA is centralized and the European Commission is responsible for the management, whilst 
the additional three components are only open for candidate countries having decentralized 
management and  demonstrate autonomous programming and management capacities 
(Szelmér 2008: 18). The component of Transition Assistance and Institution Building focuses on 
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the implementation of the main priorities of the European Partnership between EU and Albania 
and in particular the investment of institution-building, transition and stabilization-measures. The 
funds are delivered through annual national and multi-beneficiary programmes (Website: 
European Commission - Albania Financial Assistance). The Multi-annual Indicative Financial 
Framework (MIFF) is designed to form a link between the political framework and the budgetary 
process and is thus designed to provide information of the Commission incentives in terms of 
the financial allocations for each component (European Commission: Website: Planning of the 
IPA). The assistance is based on the progress of Albania as described in the progress reports 
as well as the progress expected by the SAP (IPA 2006: 6) and for the period of 2007-2010, 
Albania will receive EUR 306.1 million from the IPA programme (O’Brennan & Gassie 2009: 69), 
a bigger figure than what Albania received under the CARDS-programme, which amounted to 
EUR 282.1 million (European Commission: Website: EU-Albania Relations). Based on the 
allocations identified in the MIFF as well as the identified priorities within the political framework, 
each year the EU develops the Multi-Annual Indicative Planning Documents (MIPD) for each 
country eligible for funds under the IPA. In the documents the specific objectives of the pre-
accession aid is identified (European Commission, Albania Enlargement Website).  
 
7.2 The application of the External Incentive Model 
In order to analyse how EU conditionality has impacted the behavioural rule adoption of the Civil 
Service Law in Albania the External Incentive Model is utilized. The four factors of the model: 
the credibility of the conditions, the determinacy, the size and speed of the rewards and the role 
of veto players and adoption costs will be analysed and applied to the behavioural rule adoption 
of the CSL in Albania.  
 
7.2.1 Determinacy of the conditions 
The determinacy of EU administrative conditionality is according to the External Incentive Model 
linked to the clarity and formality of the conditionality. This means that the clearer the 
implications and the more legalized its status is, the higher determinacy. The determinacy of the 
administrative conditionality to Albania is primarily linked to the determinacy of the SAP, 
providing the framework for the relationship of conditionality between EU and Albania in the 
period in question. The prospect of EU membership of the SAP was confirmed by the European 
Council at the Feira European Council in June 2000, at the Zagreb Summit in November 2000 
and at the Thessaloniki summit in June 2003. While this is a great step forward in granting the 
Western Balkans a membership perspective, the commitment remains political and hence, as 
pointed out by Mathias Dobbels, does not imply any legal rights (Dobbels 2009: 8) thus in itself 
only generating low determinacy. More important is the signing of the SAA for the Western 
Balkans, establishing a contractual relationship between the EU and the countries. In the 
following section the determinacy of the SAA is analysed followed by the analysis of the 
determinacy of the European Partnership.  
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7.2.1.1 The determinacy of the SAA 
The SAA adds greatly to the determinacy of the EU administrative conditionality, due to the SAA 
providing a contractual, legal relationship between the EU and Albania. The Albanian authorities 
are committed to realize the provisions of the agreement within the framework of the 
conclusions of the Council of European Union of 29 April 1997. Article 70 establishes that 
Albania shall ensure that existing and future laws and legislation will gradually be made 
compatible with the acquis communautaire. This requires Albania to ensure institution-building 
of the public administration to ensure the support of the rule of law implementation as well as for 
the proper functioning of the state institutions. It is emphasized that the cooperation shall mainly 
focus “on the institution-building, including the development and implementation of transparent 
and impartial recruitment procedures, human resources management, career development for 
the public service, continued training and the promotion of ethics within the public administration 
and e-government”. The cooperation shall cover both the central and local administrations (SAA 
between EU & Albania 2006: Article 111). The Albanian authorities are hence committed to 
realize further reform in the area of public administration, which will be understood as entailing 
the implementation and enhancement of the CSL, though not directly pointed to. The area is a 
central condition of the EU, evident by being a key issue of the European Partnership between 
EU and Albania. This is analysed below.   
 
7.2.1.3 The determinacy of the European Partnership 
The European Partnership is essential to the determinacy of EU administrative conditionality as 
it provides a clear list of reform priorities, enhancing the clarity of the SAP and the SAA. Within 
the first European Partnership between EU and Albania of 14 June 2004 (2004/519 EC) a key 
short term-priority is the functioning of the public administration, herein the functioning of the 
Civil Service Law and steps towards its improvement as well as the prevention of undue political 
interference, to provide guidelines to the recruitment, transfer and dismissal for all civil servants 
and implement them (European Partnership 14. February 2004: chapter 3.1). In the European 
Partnership of 30 January 2006 (2006/54/EC) a key short term priority is to ensure “that 
recruitment, appointments, promotion, transfers and dismissals are conducted according to the 
established rules in order to build an accountable, efficient civil service, based on professional 
career development criteria”. This is repeated within the latest European Partnership of 18 
February 2008 (2008/210/EC) between EU and Albania. Within this, another short-term priority 
of the Albanian authorities entails the enforcement of the Civil Service Law. The medium-term 
priorities entail the introduction of results-oriented management and training for civil servants, 
as well as the design and implementation of a civil service salary structure, designed to allow for 
proper budgetary planning as well as motivate career structures (European Partnership 18. 
February 2008: chapter 3.1). In total, since the first European Partnership between EU and 
Albania of 14 June 2004, the European Partnership has offered the Albanian authorities a clear 
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set of guidelines to the behavioural rule adoption of the CSL, enhancing the determinacy of EU 
administrative conditionality.   
 
7.2.2 Credibility of the conditions 
Considering the credibility of EU administrative conditionality, two aspects will be considered. 
As the External Incentive Model prescribes that the determinacy of the conditions, as analysed 
above, adds to the credibility of the conditions, this aspect will first be analysed. Furthermore 
the credibility of the prospect of EU membership will be analysed.  
 
7.2.2.1 Credibility of the instruments of the SAP 
Considering the analysis of the determinacy of the SAP and here within the SAA and the 
European Partnership, the credibility of the SAP is considered high, due to the clarity and 
formality of the SAA and the European Partnership. The later ads greatly to the clarity of the EU 
administrative conditionality by providing the Albanian government with a clear set of priorities 
to the behavioural adoption of the CSL, whilst the high determinacy understood as high legality 
is especially evident after the signing of the SAA. The signing of this in 2006 and the 
enforcement of this in 2009 adds to the credibility by showing clear progress in the negotiations 
when fulfilment of EU conditions are met.  
 
7.2.2.2 Credibility of prospect of EU membership 
When deciding on the credibility of the prospect of EU membership for Albania one needs to 
turn to the substance of the EU administrative conditionality linked to the prospect of EU 
membership, and therefore to the substance of the governance mode. By the finding of the 
successful rule transfer in the eastern enlargement were obtained by a credible membership 
perspective, Florian Trauner argues that one must assume that the EU’s leverage to the 
Western Balkans has changed for the worse since the prospect of EU membership is more 
vague and only offers an unclear accession horizon (Trauner 2009: 777). Furthermore, Dobbels 
argues that this is the case when considering that there still seems to be some reluctance of 
some EU member states to actively pursue enlargement for the countries of the Western 
Balkan. It is especially evident due to the candidacy applications of Albania and Montenegro is 
still pending (Dobbels 2009: 9). The opening of negotiation talks with other countries, which in 
the case of the Western Balkans means Croatia and Macedonia, might however according to 
Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, increase the credibility of the conditions though the impact of EU 
conditionality to potential candidate countries is still considered being lower than the impact to 
candidate countries (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier 2004: 666). Adapting these arguments to 
the prospect of EU membership to Albania, a potential candidate country, the credibility of EU 
membership can be concluded lower than the credibility if Albania had been a candidate 
country. The signing of the SAA however adds to the credibility, by showing clear progress in 
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the negotiation process, though the lack of the EU to reply to the membership application of 
Albania draws the conditionality back again.  
 
7.2.3 Size and speed of rewards 
The size and speed of EU rewards is understood to regard both the progress of the negotiations 
leading towards EU membership, the financial assistance of the SAP as well as the access to 
the single market. The EU is the main trading partner in Albania, in 2005 representing about 74 
per cent of Albania’s total imports and 85 per cent of the total exports (European Commission 
Progress Report to Albania 2005: 5). The size and speed of the rewards understood as the 
opening of negotiations have been analysed in terms of both the determinacy and credibility of 
the EU administrative conditionality, and the findings will here instead be analysed in 
relationship with the financial assistance. The economic rewards as access to the single market 
and bilateral agreements will not be included. For a description of the empirical data-collection 
and strategy of deciding on which components are analysed, see chapter 4, section 3. The 
following section will focus on the financial assistance programmes of the SAP: The CARDS 
programme and the IPA programme.  
 
7.2.3.1 The CARDs programme 
The financial support for administrative capacity building in Albania by the EU was in the first 
three years of the programme, the period of 2001-2004, significant. The total investment was 
more than 28 million Euros, with assistance directed towards a wide range of public 
administration functions. These include internal and external assessment, taxation and 
customs, public procurement, competition, state aid and direct support to DoPA, in charge for 
the implementation of the civil service law (IPA 2008 National Programme for Albania: 8). The 
financial support to administrative capacity building was part of the larger financial framework of 
the CARDS programme, in which Albania between 2000 and 2004 benefited from around EUR 
240 million. In 2005 Albania received EUR 44.2 million (European Commission 2005: 5) whilst 
the financial assistance in 2006 amounted to EUR 45.5 million (European Commission 2006: 5). 
During 2004-2006 DoPA was further supported by the Delegation of the European Commission 
in Albania. The support was enhanced under CARDS 2003 “On Encouraging the Reform in the 
Albanian Civil Service” The project aims at enhancing the capacity of the DoPA (IPA 2008 
National Programme for Albania: 3.1). As the CARDS programme was found to need 
improvements and the IPA programme introduced to tackle these problems, the impact of the 
size and speed of the rewards to the behavioural rule adoption of the CSL will be analysed 
together after the analysis of the IPA in the following.  
 
7.2.3.2 The IPA programme 
Whilst the financial assistance of the CARDS programme was directed to a range of areas, the 
EU introduced with the IPA a new form of assistance, where Albania as a potential candidate 
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country is only eligible for funds for two of IPA’s five components: The components of Transition 
Assistance and Institution Building as well as Cross-Border Cooperation. Since the introduction 
of IPA, three Multi-Annual Indicative Planning Documents (MIPD’s) have been developed 
(2007-2009, 2008-2010 and 2009-2011). In all of these reforms of the public administration is at 
the centre of attention: Within MIPD of Albania for the period of 2007-2009 it is stated the 
financial aid should contribute to the reform of the public administration in order to obtain a 
reform, effective, harmonized, streamline and transparent public administration, capable in 
guiding Albania through the SAP (MIPD Albania 2007-2009: 14). In the following MIPD the 
purpose advanced further and it is stated that an expected result is the advancement of the 
public administration reform. This entails the introduction of professional career development 
criteria, appraisal, promotion, conduct and the dismissal of civil servants (MIPD Albania 2008-
20010: 17). The statement is repeated in the MIPD of 2009-2011 (MIPD Albania 2009-2011: 
14). Part of the financial assistance to Albania under the IPA is furthermore the “IPA 2008 
National Programme for Albania: Support to Albanian Department of Public Administration”. The 
allocation for this project accounts for EUR 1 million and aims at enhance the capacity of the 
DoPA as well as TIPA, (IPA 2008 National Programme for Albania).  
 
7.2.3.3 The impact of CARDS and IPA  
A critique of the IPA programme is the differentiation of potential and candidate countries, which 
Szelmér finds is a fundamental obstacle of rapid growth: the least developed countries will not 
have access to assistance in the most important fields of development (Szelmér 2008: 20). 
However, as further opening of financial chapters by the programme is directly dependent on 
reform of the public administration, the differentiation between candidate countries and potential 
candidate countries should anyway induce institutional reform in the area of public 
administration as it will provide an effective incentive for the government for improving the 
institutions. The IPA should therefore accordingly have a higher impact on the behavioural rule 
transfer than the CARDS programme. In details this means that the project of the CARDS 
programme in regard to the CSL, induced to enhance the capacity of the DoPA as well as TIPA, 
should be less effective than the IPA programme of 2008, also aiming to induce the capacity of 
DoPA. The analysis of this suffer from the limitation of the IPA programme is still in progress 
and the analysis of this need to be considered preliminary.  
 
7.2.4 Veto players and adoption costs 
The analysis of the formal rule adoption of the CSL clearly showed that the adoption costs and 
interest of veto players at the domestic level is of central importance when analysing the 
transfer of rules and standards from EU to Albania in the area of reform of the public 
administration. In deciding the importance to the behavioural rule adoption it is necessary to 
establish whether the political and socio-economic situation has changed or whether same 
situation will be theorized to affect the rule adoption of the CSL.  
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In the period in which EU conditionality has been linked to the prospect of EU membership, EU 
integration has been a priority of all political parties in Albania. This was introduced in chapter 2, 
section 4. According to the External Incentive Model the political actors need to be united or 
close to a consensus, otherwise the adopted EU rules may end up being disregarded, 
contested and changed after accession, or simply remain empty frameworks. Thus, if there is a 
fit between the EU conditions and the reform consensus, successful institutionalization is likely. 
The political consensus of EU membership in Albania means that the EU conditions to the 
behavioural rule adoption of the CSL should lead to a successful reform of the public 
administration and a professional, independent and merit-based civil service established in 
Albania. As was established it in the former chapter, the CSL of 1999 had reduced the scope of 
the law and by such turned away from the institutionalization of EU conditions in the area of civil 
service. This means that the behavioural adoption should also entail the widening of the scope 
of the civil service if to be considered successful, as explained above. This is also to be 
expected due to the political consensus. Another domestic factor enhancing the argument is the 
economic situation, and albeit a sustainable and continuing economic growth since the 
immediate years of the economic crisis in the aftermath of the events of 1997 Albania is still 
dependent on the economic assistance of the EU and it is hence in the interest of the 
government to fulfil the requirements induced by the EU.   
 
On the other hand the interests of the political players are still found to hamper the political 
environment. According to the logic of rational choice institutionalism political actors are utility-
maximizers, seeking to maximize their own interest. In Albanian politics this is of central 
importance, as the system since its very beginning has been characterised by political actors 
seeking their own interest rather than the interest of their party or electorates. This was further 
introduced in chapter 4, section 1, 2 and 3. If a successful transfer of EU rules is to be 
expected, the EU has to, according to the External Incentive Model, introduce incentives for 
compliance. The introduction of incentives for compliance with the EU conditions affects the 
domestic status quo, which may either happen through intergovernmental bargaining or 
indirectly through the different empowerment of domestic actors. Accordingly and specifically to 
the case of Albania, the EU has to introduce strong incentives for the political actors for the rule 
transfer to take place. As the adoption of EU rules and standards in the area of establishing a 
professional civil service in the previous chapter was found to hamper the interest of the political 
actors, a change has to have occurred and it is relevant questioning whether the prospect of EU 
membership may have altered the interests of the political actors.  
 
The political struggles which empirically has been established as a continuing characteristic of 
the Albanian political system does however not provide for the finding of EU membership should 
alter the benefits of the political veto players and it will by such be argued, that the rule adoption 
of the CSL, as this already hampers the interest of the veto players in Albania, is considered to 
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be low. This is the case even though there, as established in the previous chapter is a strong 
misfit between the EU administrative conditions and the domestic status quo as to which the EU 
induce conditions being of both high determinacy and credibility for change.  
 
7.2.5 Summery 
It has above been concluded that EU administrative conditionality was of a higher determinacy 
and credibility than EU administrative conditionality not linked to a prospect of EU membership. 
The European Partnership added to the clarity of the determinacy whilst the SAA added to the 
legality of the determinacy. Prospect of EU membership added to the credibility of the 
conditionality, which however also suffer from the lack of EU to return its opinion to the Albanian 
application for membership to the EU, which would move Albania from being a potential 
candidate state to a candidate state. None the less, the political struggles which have been 
established as a continuing characteristic of the Albanian politics does not provide for finding 
that EU membership should alter the benefits of the political veto players and it was argued, that 
the behavioural rule adoption of the CSL, as this already hamper the interest of the veto players 
in Albania, is considered to be low. This was established even though there is a strong misfit 
between the EU administrative conditions and the domestic status quo as to which the EU 
induce conditions being of both high determinacy and credibility for change, as well as reform-
consensus of the political parties in regard to Albanian membership of the EU. 
 
In the following section the behavioural of the rule adoption of the CSL in Albania, linked to the 
prospect of EU membership, will be introduced. This will lead to the analysis in which the 
conclusions of the impact of revised EU administrative conditionality, by the application of the 
External Incentive Model, will provide for the answering of the guiding research questions. This 
will together with the partly answering of the first guiding research question of the previous 
chapter enable the answering of the research question.    
  
7.3 The behavioural rule adoption of the CSL 
The process of implementing and enhancing the legal framework of the civil service law has 
been in the hands of the DoPA. DoPA is responsible for carrying out the tasks of managing civil 
service in all central administration institutions, leading and implementing functional and 
structural reforms in public administration institutions, drafting and implementing the salary 
reform and coordination of the work for the functioning of the Central Register of Personnel (IPA 
2008 National Programme for Albania). DoPA has undertaken several initiatives in relation to 
public administration reform and the role of DoPA in this regards is in the IPA 2008 National 
Programme for Albania described as significant and of crucial importance. In 2003 DoPA had a 
leading role in reforming the salary system in the public administrations institutions. In 2005 
DoPA also initiated a general review of public administration institutions, finding that existing 
structures were characterized by over employment and low efficiency. The findings resulted in 
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reforming efforts on staff reduction. DoPA is also a crucial player in the last years measures 
taken in reforming the salary system by drafting new legislation, and has furthermore been 
involved in projects aiming to increase the use of computer technology in the public 
administration. In 2005 DoPA became a unit reporting to the Minister of Interior, instead of the 
Prime Minister, due to the implementing of the government program (IPA 2008 National 
Programme for Albania)  
 
Though the role of DoPA has been enhanced, the behavioural rule adoption of the Civil Service 
Law in Albania has been met with a number of difficulties. In regard to the negotiations of the 
SAA, the Commission warned the Albanian government that the pace of reform implementation 
risked the negotiations of being long and drawn out (Vurmu 2008: 23). In the 2003 status report 
it is stated that progress in the public administration regretfully has been offset by political 
nominations and nepotisms in a number of crucial areas, and the public administration remains 
weak (European Commission 2003: 2-3) This is repeated in 2005 in which the Commission 
states that the civil service remains hindered by a pervasive lack of understanding the need to 
implement the law, as well as a will to do so (European Commission: 11-12) and in 2006 it is 
stated that the hiring and dismissal of staff have occurred without due attention to the law. 
(European Commission 2006: 6-7). The situation is the same when turning to the latest 
progress reports where the Commission states that whilst the civil service legal framework is 
largely in place and is well developed, it is often ignored by policymakers, affecting DoPA to 
play a weak role in protecting and promoting the principles of the civil service (European 
Commission 2009: 9). The SAP report of 2007 stressed that the political appointments to senior 
and mid-level positions is a continuing process without any due attention to the CSL, a matter 
which was repeated in the 2008 and 2009 reports (European Commission 2007: 8 and 2008 : 9 
and 2009: 9). Due to such reasons the 2009 report reminds the Albanian authorities that the 
transparency and accountability in appointments remains a key European Partnership priority to 
be addressed (European Commission 2009: 9).  
 
7.4 Conclusions of the impact of EU administrative conditionality 
Looking to the empirical findings of the actual behavioural rule adoption of the CSL both 
progress and lack of such have been recorded. On the positive side is that DoPA became a unit 
reporting to the Minister of Interior, instead of the Prime Minister, which reduces the possibility 
of political interference and the capacity of the DoPA should accordingly have been advanced. 
The Albanian government has also addresses a range of shortcomings of the framework of the 
law. None the less this is shadowed by the lack of political willingness: the law is often ignored 
by policymakers, reducing DoPA to play a weak role in protecting and promoting the principles 
of the civil service. The situation indicates that the high determinacy and credibility of the EU 
administrative conditionality has not had sufficient effect due to the EU administrative 
conditionality not altering the interest of the political actors. The political consensus of EU 
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membership has no impact to this situation. The same is the situation when considering the 
impact of the size and speed of rewards in terms of financial assistance rather than prospect of 
EU membership. It was in the analysis established that the differentiation between candidate 
countries and potential candidate countries should induce institutional reform in the area of 
public administration as it will provide a financial incentive for the government for improving the 
institutions. The IPA should therefore accordingly have a higher impact on the behavioural rule 
transfer than the CARDS programme. However there is no indicator of the IPA programme 
having a larger impact than the CARDS programme, though it is too early to fully conclude so. 
All together the instruments of the EU administrative conditionality though being linked to the 
prospect of EU membership and have both higher determinacy and credibility has not induced 
strong enough incentives to lead to behavioural rule adoption.  
  
In the following the main analytical arguments is summarized and the guiding research 
questions by such answered.  
 
7.4.1 Main analytical arguments 
Linking EU administrative conditionality to the prospect of EU membership instead of financial 
assistance and negotiations of bilateral agreements without a prospect of EU membership has 
not lead to sufficient behavioural rule adoption of the CSL in Albania and hence has not lead to 
sufficient behavioural rule adoption of EU conditions related to the reform of the public 
administration. The main factor affecting the rule adoption is, as was the case in the previous 
chapter, the interest of the political actors of not implementing and enhancing the law. This is 
evident as not even political consensus, which should lead to high adoption pressure, has 
sufficient impact. This indicates that the high determinacy and credibility of EU membership 
does alter the interest of the political actors sufficiently. The analysis does therefore not lead to 
a conclusion of the development of EU administrative conditionality, which did increase the 
determinacy and credibility of EU administrative conditionality, leads to a higher level of rule 
adoption and hence to reform of the public administration in Albania.   
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8. Conclusion  
 
In the previous two chapters EU administrative conditionality has been analysed by the case 
study of the rule adoption of the Civil Service Law in Albania. The conclusions of the analysis 
will in the following provide the background for the answering of the research question in this 
chapter, and this chapter hence provides the conclusion to the project.  
 
EU administrative conditionality does not lead to reform of the public administration in the 
Western Balkans without a domestic political environment ready and willing to fully adopt the 
conditions of the EU. This has clearly been shown by the case study: Domestic politics decide 
the level of the rule adoption. Political consensus regarding EU integration does not 
automatically lead to formal and behavioural reform of the public administration due to the 
political consensus need to be transformed into political actions confirming the consensus. The 
case study has not lead to the conclusion that this is the case in the Western Balkans. EU can 
therefore develop EU administrative conditionality to the best of its ability as to ensure high 
determinacy and credibility; if the EU meanwhile does not alter the incentives of the domestic 
political actors, rule adoption will not take place or only create empty frameworks for reform of 
the public administration. Hence, a strong misfit between the domestic status quo and EU 
administrative conditionality of high determinacy and legality does not automatically lead to rule 
adoption of EU conditions related to the reform of the public administration in the Western 
Balkans. When the literature of EU conditionality therefore points to the vague prospect of EU 
membership in order to explain the low level of rule adoption in the Western Balkans, the 
literature neglects to take domestic politics and intervening factors into consideration.  
 
Furthermore, it cannot be concluded that the factor of EU being the largest donor in the region 
and the offering of prospect of EU membership to the region may lead to reform of the public 
administration. The case study indicates that these factors do not automatically lead to the 
establishment of a public administration capable of ensuring democratic and economic reform 
as well being capable of implementing the acquis communautaire. The single case study clearly 
showed that rule adoption linked to both financial assistance and prospect of EU membership 
can lead to the adoption of a framework meant to show willingness rather than meant to reform 
the public administration. The result is an empty framework. This shows that EU-driven reform 
(through EU administrative conditionality) does not lead to the establishment of a public 
administration capable of ensuring democratic and economic reform in the Western Balkans as 
well as being capable of implementing the acquis communautaire of the EU. Henceforth EU 
administrative conditionality leads to reform of the public administration when being owned by 
national politicians and in the interest of these, making EU administrative conditionality 
dependent of being capable of altering the incentives of the political actors to a larger extent 
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than is the case of EU administrative conditionality to the rule adoption of the CSL in Albania in 
the period of 1996-2009.   
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 9. Perspectives 
 
The conclusions of the project are based on the specific methodology of a single case study 
and the theory of the External Incentive Model and it is hence relevant to discuss alternative 
approaches. 
 
An interesting strategy would be to address the research question from the perspective of the 
Europeanization of national administrations offered by Christoph Knill. When interested in 
studying administrative transformation Knill argues that one necessarily has to look to the 
administrative impact of the implementation of other European policies to the domestic 
administrative practises and structures (Knill 2001: 1). Adapting the strategy to the research 
area of this case study it provides the opportunity of analysing the reform of the public 
administration by not analysing the administrative conditionality of the EU, but the transfer of 
rules, understood as both of a formal and behavioural character, of for example economic or 
democratic policies. An analysis of how this leads to transformation of administrative structures 
and practises would provide valuable information of whether other EU conditionalities affect the 
reform of the public administration, to what degree the impact is different from EU administrative 
conditionality and furthermore what way the rule adoption alters the incentives of domestic 
political veto players. The later is of special interest as it in the project was decided that this is 
the main factor deciding the transfer of EU rules. One may analyse the EU rule adoption as 
changing domestic opportunity structures or as framing domestic beliefs and expectations (Knill 
2001: 213-225).  
 
Another relevant way to analyse the impact of the EU to the reform of the public administration 
is to utilize discourse as a framework for the institutional analysis. Vivian Schmidt (2006: 249-
251) argues that discourse serves to redefine interests, reshape structures and create new 
norms and discourse institutionalism hence shows the dynamics through changes of ideas and 
in the discursive interaction among policy actors (Schmidt 2006: 250). This approach would be 
relevant as to analyse the discursive rule transfer, providing information not only useful to 
understand the domestic factors and hesitance to adopt the EU rules but also to analyse EU 
administrative conditionality by a study of its discourse as established by the EU, which could 
provide further information of the lack of reform of the public administration. The analysis could 
take point of departure in statements, speeches and opinion leaders (Schmidt 2006: 251) 
offered from the EU as well as from the Albanian government.  
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